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In his American Bar Association Journal article, The Common Law
1
of Morrison County, John Simonett mused that Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. must have had Morrison County in mind when he said
that the life of the law has been experience rather than logic.
Reading Justice Simonett’s opinions, you can almost see the
Morrison County watermark. In fact, a more tempting title for an
essay on Justice John E. Simonett and the law of torts might be,
“You Can Take the Judge out of Morrison County, But You Can’t
Take Morrison County out of the Judge.”
In his article, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize
2
Appellate Decisions, Justice Simonett explored what it means when a
court is accused of arriving at a “result-oriented” decision. His
article points out that “[e]ach time judges seek to find a way to
attain a certain result that to them seems just under the
circumstances, they are, of course, being result-minded,” but
† Margaret H. and James E. Kelley Professor of Tort Law, William Mitchell
College of Law.
1. John E. Simonett, The Common Law of Morrison County, 49 A.B.A. J. 263
(1963).
2. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984).
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“result-oriented” should be used pejoratively not just when there is
disagreement with a decision, but only if the decision represents a
3
departure from decision-making norms.
His commentary on the format and substance—the norms—of
appellate opinions is a window to an examination of his opinions
involving tort law and tort-related issues:
The typical appellate opinion in its published form
marches along in an orderly fashion, but it should come
as no surprise that the court, consciously or
unconsciously, may not be setting out all the factors that
entered into its decision. In their written opinions, judges
are not necessarily expected to state the reasons for
deciding as they did, but only to justify their decision with
reasoning that is respectable and authorities that are
appropriate.
The published opinion may march inexorably
forward step-by-step toward a conclusion, but it is unlikely
that the judge’s mental processes proceeded in that
manner. Rather than to march forward, it is likely that
the human mind (to switch metaphors) tends to hover,
until finally, it alights on a conclusion.
“General
propositions do not decide concrete cases,” said Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, adding, “[t]he decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise.” The key notion here is that of
inarticulateness.
What may seem to be reasoning
backwards from a desired result may be a normal process
of reasoning from an inarticulate premise intuitively felt
but nevertheless real and meritorious. Even if one could
go behind a written opinion to see how the result was
reached, there is no certainty that one would be any the
wiser. So, a result-oriented decision cannot fairly be cast
in a pejorative light merely on surmise about that which
4
the court “really had in mind.”
Appellate courts perform dual functions of making new law and
correcting error:
As to the latter, the appellate court plays a limited role as
a court of review and is expected to give due deference to
the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. As
to the former, the lawmaking role, the appellate court is

3.
4.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 193–94 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
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expected to decide new issues in a reasoned manner, with
respect for precedent and the judiciary’s role in a
government of separated power, and, if established law is
to be overruled, to do so candidly, sparingly, and for good
cause. For example, if judges are neither required nor
necessarily expected to state all their reasons for deciding
as they did, at a minimum, they are expected to justify
their result with scrupulous handling of the facts, honest
reasoning, and pertinent precedent. Legitimate reasons
for the result must be articulated even if they are not all
the reasons and even if the true motivation for the result
5
is only intuitively felt.
While decisions may of necessity be result-oriented, a “decision is
bad when it gives the impression of being ad hoc justice,
unprincipled, and dependent on the personal predilections of the
6
judges.” Justice Simonett’s opinions most certainly never give the
appearance of ad hoc justice; they are always principled; they do
not appear to be based on his personal predilections. There are
several identifying characteristics of his opinions, as I read them.
1. The opinions show a deep respect for the trial process and the
role of the judge and jury in that process. Simonett, the
7
experienced trial lawyer, always seemed to be looking on.
5. Id. at 195–96.
6. Id. at 196.
7. There are many examples. Justice Simonett’s comments on summary
judgment practice in Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1985), is an
excellent one. The case was a medical malpractice case that turned on the
admissibility of the opinion of a licensed consulting psychologist as to whether the
defendant family practice physician was negligent in his prescription of
antipsychotic medication. Justice Simonett held that it was not error for the trial
court to consider an unsworn and untimely letter submitted by the psychologist,
particularly since the defense attorney made only a vague objection to the letter.
In a footnote, Justice Simonett added the following observations on making a
record for summary judgment motions:
We do not mean to minimize the importance of making a proper
record for a summary judgment motion. As Professor Moore has
commented, in addition to the pleadings, affidavits and depositions, the
trial court in deciding a motion may consider oral testimony, facts subject
to judicial notice, stipulations, concessions of counsel, and any other
material that would be admissible in evidence or otherwise usable at trial.
6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[7] (1985). The
informality which sometimes accompanies motion practice should not,
however, lull counsel into taking less care in making their record for
summary judgment than they would for a trial. It is important, both for
clarity and fairness, that court and counsel all know and agree on the
contents of the record.
Lundgren, 370 N.W.2d at 881 n.1.
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2. His opinions are carefully structured to provide guidance in
the form of intelligible, workable principles that judges and
lawyers will not have to struggle to understand. Appellate
opinions make law, but determining how that law is translated
for juries may often be difficult. He would often provide
guidance by suggesting a potential jury instruction, “along
these lines . . . [,]” but of course leaving it up to judges and
8
lawyers how best to implement the opinion.
3. His opinions are often didactic, but without really seeming to
be so. This characteristic seems to be particularly prominent
in his concurring opinions, in which he uses to advantage the
chance to explain some nuance of the case that was perhaps
overlooked in the majority opinion. This leads to a fourth and
related point.
4. His opinions are scholarly, although I am not sure if he would
have liked that label, at least if the term is used pejoratively to
describe work that judges and lawyers can’t use; but he wrote
the same way in his law review articles as he did in his
9
opinions. He always brings theory home. His audience was
the bench and bar.
5. His opinions are relatively short, as opinions go, supported
10
with appropriate authority, but not overloaded with it. The
opinions get to the point quickly. They are not overburdened
11
by complicating footnotes.
8. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 n.2 (Minn. 1984)
(Simonett, J., concurring specially).
9. See, e.g., John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome:
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361 (1995).
In the preface to his article he notes:
The latest draft [of the Restatement (Third)] has four topics, thirteen
sections with seventy-nine comments, plus detailed reporters’ notes.
While much has happened, one is left with the impression that the law
has come full circle. Except for the manufacturing defect, products
liability law now appears to be pretty much negligence tort law but with
its own idiosyncratic features.
Id. at 361. He cuts to the quick in his analysis, the same as he did in his products
liability opinions dealing with the problem of how to handle design defect cases.
He provides guidance for trial judges and lawyers who have to deal with the
problem of trying and submitting complicated products liability cases to juries.
10. Kevin G. Ross, A Few Lessons from the Master Craftsman: Justice John Simonett
the Writer, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 708, 714 (2013).
11. In deference to and in honor of Justice Simonett, footnotes in this essay
are limited. His article, John E. Simonett, The Footnote as Excursion and Diversion, 55
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What follows is a brief discussion of his opinions covering nine
sometimes-overlapping areas of tort and tort-related law. The
discussion highlights these characteristics.
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The supreme court adopted strict liability in tort in 1967 in
12
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., but in Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing,
13
Inc., the court was still in the process of working out the
implications of the theory. One of the problems concerned the
relationship between overlapping theories of recovery of strict
liability, breach of warranty, and negligence.
In Holm, the supreme court jettisoned the latent-patent danger
rule it had adopted six years earlier in Halvorson v. American Hoist
14
and Derrick Co. as inconsistent with the policy justifications that
originally prompted the adoption of strict liability theory in
McCormack. There was a second issue in Halvorson that created
problems, the issue of an inconsistent verdict that occurred when
the jury found that the defendant crane manufacturer was not
strictly liable, but was negligent. In Holm, which was factually
similar, the supreme court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial
on both his negligence and strict liability counts, which included
design defect and failure to warn allegations. That created the
potential for the same inconsistent verdict that had occurred in
Halvorson.
A.B.A. J. 1141, 1141 (1969), begins with a reflection on the footnote addiction:
Lawyers have a passion for documentation. When counsel’s
experienced eye first scans a legal manuscript, whether it be an appellate
court’s opinion, a brief, memorandum or article, the presence or
absence of footnotes immediately registers on the legal subconscious. If
the text flows on serenely for any distance without the ripple of at least a
footnote or two, counsel knows, knows in his bones, before reading
further, that the text is suspect.
The article notes that excursionary footnotes are worthwhile. Defining an
“excursion” as “a short trip taken with the intention of returning to the point of
departure; short journey for health or pleasure,” the article suggests that a good
footnote should accomplish just exactly that. Id. The conclusion urges the use of
the excursionary footnote: “In the sombre tomes of jurisprudence, and
particularly there, midst the inundation of terms, concepts, doctrines, principles
and premises that articulate the law, there should occasionally be respite, a
footnote or two, some time taken for a short journey for pleasure or health.” Id. at
1143.
12. 278 Minn. 322, 337–40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499–501 (1967).
13. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
14. 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976).
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Justice Simonett agreed with the court’s opinion on the latentpatent danger issue, but dissented from the court’s conclusion that
the plaintiff should be permitted to advance to trial on both his
15
negligence and strict liability theories. He noted the confusion in
products liability law caused by the overlapping theories of strict
liability, breach of warranty, and negligence theory, but, he wrote,
“[w]hile fine distinctions can be made, these are often of little help
to the trial bench that has to instruct the jury and to the jury that
16
has to bring in a verdict.”
He saw the case as essentially a
negligence case:
[T]he plaintiff was working on an aerial ladder in close
proximity to an electric powerline.
He knew the
powerline was there and he knew the dangers involved.
Nevertheless, in maneuvering the ladder, he “made a
mistake,” as his counsel put it, by “unconsciously exposing
himself” to an obvious danger. As a consequence,
plaintiff’s arm (apparently not the ladder itself) came in
contact with the powerline. Plaintiff’s theory, really, is
that the manufacturer could have protected him from his
forgetfulness by doing more than affixing warning decals
to the ladder, however adequate their message might be;
the manufacturer should have equipped the ladder with
insulation, sensors or other proximity warning devices
which would have either warned plaintiff he was too close
to the electric wires or prevented an electric current from
17
passing through plaintiff to the ground.
The case involved negligence issues, including the issue of whether
the manufacturer could reasonably have foreseen that its ladder
would be used in proximity to power lines, but there was a
corresponding duty on the plaintiff’s part to use reasonable care
for his own safety. The key point was that negligence law serves the
same policy considerations as strict liability law. Manufacturers are
held accountable according to a theory that requires “weighing the
likelihood and severity of the harm (electrocution) against the
burden of adding safety devices more effective than warning decals
18
He asked the question of why it was
(insulation or sensors).”
necessary to impose yet another theory on the case, “a strict liability
15. Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 213–14 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 214.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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theory that is really a carbon copy of the negligence action.” In
his opinion, “[a]s a practical matter, where the strict liability claim
is based on unsafe design or failure to warn, as is this case, there is
20
essentially no difference between strict liability and negligence.”
Four years later, Justice Simonett’s views became the law in
21
Bilotta v. Kelley Co. The majority accepted the effective merger of
negligence and strict liability theory. Justice Simonett, concurring
specially in that case, explained his understanding of the
differences:
In a design defect case, I do not think it can be said
that either negligence or strict liability is “broader” than
the other. The most that can be said is that, depending
on the facts of a particular case, the proof needed to
survive a defendant’s motion for directed verdict may vary,
so that one theory is “better” than the other for purposes
of recovery. In other words, the distinctions between
strict liability and negligence may be important to the trial
court in deciding whether the case goes to the jury, but
once the case is submitted, insofar as the jury is
concerned, any distinction between strict liability and
negligence is nonexistent where the claim is for design
22
defect or failure to warn.
Characteristically, he considered how a case would be
submitted to a jury under a merged theory. He agreed with the
majority that a design defect case should be submitted under a
single theory of products liability. In his view, the instruction could
be labeled either negligence or strict liability because the theory is
23
“something of both.” He agreed with the majority that in design
defect cases a reasonable care balancing approach was appropriate,
and that the instruction could be labeled either negligence or strict
liability. In a footnote, he suggested how an instruction might be
framed:
A product is unsafely designed if, by reason of its
design, the product is in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user. The manufacturer
has a duty to use due care to design a product that does
not create an unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 215.
346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
Id. at 625–26 (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
Id. at 626.
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likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is put
to its intended use or to any unintended yet reasonably
foreseeable use.
The reasonable care to be exercised by a
manufacturer in the design of a product will depend on
all the facts and circumstances, including, among others,
a balancing of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness
of that harm against the feasibility and burden of any
24
precautions which would be effective to avoid the harm.
Of course, he noted that the proposed instruction was “only a
suggestion,” and that “trial bench and bar is best situated to devise
25
the appropriate instructions.”
26
In Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., decided three years after Bilotta,
the plaintiff was injured because of an alleged defect in the
automatic transmission shifting mechanism of a Ford pickup truck.
A jury found that the truck was defective. Ford appealed, arguing
that the trial court should have granted Ford’s motion for a
directed verdict due to the lack of proof of a feasible alternative
design or, in the alternative, that the trial court should have given
Ford’s requested instruction relating to proof of a feasible
alternative.
Justice Simonett, concurring specially, wrote to
comment on additional evidence the plaintiff offered to establish a
design defect. The plaintiff’s expert previously testified in a
different trial that the Ford transmission system was not
unreasonably dangerous, but in the Kallio case he testified that he
had invented a device that, although untested and possessing some
bugs, and never installed in a vehicle, would, with substantial work,
fix the problem. The majority characterized the evidence as
“weak,” but Justice Simonett thought the expert did not show that
his alternative design was practical and that his testimony may not
have withstood a motion to strike, had Ford made one. He
commented on the proof problems inherent in design defect cases
on his way to stating his agreement with the outcome of the case, if
not the majority’s rationale in getting there:
Conscious design defects present difficult problems of
proof for both plaintiffs and manufacturers. There is
much room for second guessing, and courts are being
asked to establish standards of reasonableness for
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 626 n.2.
Id.
407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss3/11

8

Steenson: Justice John E. Simonett and the Law of Torts

804

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

manufacturers (whether it be Ford or a fledgling family
operation). Establishing standards entails a weighing of
engineering, marketing, and financing factors, which, at
times, may be a difficult task for courts to perform. On
the other hand, the establishment of standards cannot
always be avoided by passing the problem off to the jury
under a general reasonable care instruction.
In any event, the limited issue before us is whether
the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant’s
requested instruction that plaintiff was required to prove
the existence of a feasible, practical alternative design. I
agree with the majority opinion that the trial court’s
instructions on burden of proof were adequate and that it
was unnecessary to give the requested instruction which
would have unduly singled out one aspect of the
proof. . . .
Sometimes where proof is lacking for a conscious
design defect, plaintiff may still be able to show breach of
a duty to warn. Here, plaintiff knew his pickup might
move if the shift lever was not completely in the park
position, and there was no need to warn on this
elementary, obvious fact. But what plaintiff did not know
was that the shift lever would feel like it was in park when
it was not. The jury could have found there should have
been a warning placed in the owner’s manual about this
27
illusory effect.
Justice Simonett’s separate opinions in these three pivotal
Minnesota products liability cases help to establish a base for design
defect and, effectively, failure to warn cases. His intuitive sense is
that those cases are really negligence cases, a conclusion that other
courts have reached and that is also the position taken in the
28
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. He also has an
acute sense of the difficulties jurors may have in determining
whether a manufacturer acted reasonably in designing a product,
suggesting, perhaps, that trial courts will have to be gatekeepers in
considering the complex balancing of factors involved in making
the alternative design determination.
These cases effectively settled arguments over distinctions
between strict liability and negligence theories.
The basic
principles have not been challenged since.
27.
28.

Id. at 101 (Simonett, J., concurring specially) (citations omitted).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
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Two other cases involved the intersection of products liability
law and the Uniform Commercial Code. In Peterson v. Bendix Home
29
Systems, Inc., he established the template for the application of
comparative fault principles to warranty claims in a straightforward
opinion that logically precludes the application of comparative
fault principles in cases involving direct and incidental damages
that were unaffected by plaintiff fault.
The plaintiff in the case bought a mobile home that was
manufactured by Bendix from a local dealer. Almost immediately
after she moved in she began experiencing physical problems that
were attributed in substantial part to the use of formaldehyde in
the construction of the mobile home. She brought suit against the
dealer and manufacturer, alleging strict liability, negligence, and
breach of express and implied warranties. The trial court granted a
directed verdict in favor of the dealer pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 544.41 and in favor of the manufacturer on the
negligence claim. The jury found in favor of the defendant on the
strict liability and express warranty claims but in favor of the
plaintiff on the implied warranty of merchantability claim. The
jury was asked to compare “the combined fault that caused the
30
damages.” It found that Bendix was only 25% at fault while the
plaintiff, Peterson, was 75% at fault. The jury found Peterson’s
damages for the physical harm she suffered to be $5000, the
difference in value between the mobile home as warranted and as
delivered to be $15,000, and the incidental damages for installation
and utility hookups to be $2500.
Bendix argued that since implied warranty of merchantability
sounds in tort, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred her
recovery for all damages. The opinion rejects the argument. While
holding that the plaintiff was barred from recovering for her
consequential harm from Bendix because her fault was greater
than Bendix’s, Justice Simonett explained that the plaintiff’s
contributory negligence should not bar her claim for the direct
and incidental damages. He approached the issue from two
different directions. The first was application of the language of
the Comparative Fault Act.
The Act says nothing about
consequential damages, but the definition of “fault” in section
604.01, subdivision 1(a), includes conduct that is “negligent or

29.
30.

318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 52.
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reckless toward the person or property” of another.
The definition of fault was based upon the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, however, and the comments to section 1 of
that Act make it clear that comparative fault is not intended to
cover actions “that are fully contractual in their gravamen and in
which the plaintiff is suing solely because he did not recover what
32
he contracted to receive.”
Then analyzing the warranty claim itself, the opinion reaches
the same conclusion:
Since the buyer did not design or make the defective
product, the buyer cannot be legally responsible for the
original defect. Ordinarily, a buyer’s contributory fault in
a warranty action will be some kind of product misuse or
assumption of risk. But while the buyer’s acts may bring
on or avoid certain consequential harms from the product
and thus bar recovery for such consequential harms, this
conduct should not affect the buyer’s right to recover
money paid for the defective goods. The buyer is seeking
a remedy for a bad bargain, a matter more like contract,
not for consequential damages resulting from a bad
33
product, a matter more like tort.
He continued to explore the relationship between tort and
34
warranty claims in Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., a case
involving a fire caused by a defective dental chair that also caused
other property damage. The plaintiffs included the dentist, the
building owner, and other building tenants.
The opinion first notes the difficulties involved in determining
how tort and contract remedies relate to each other in defective
product cases, which necessitates finding a principled basis for
deciding when warranty applies and when negligence and strict
liability apply. The courts have said that the Code applies when the
parties are sophisticated commercial entities or merchants, that a
tort claim is appropriate if the product is unreasonably dangerous
from a safety standpoint, and that a product failure that results in a
35
sudden and calamitous occurrence indicates a tort claim.
31. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1(a) (2010). The definition of “fault” also
includes breach of warranty.
32. Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 54 (quoting UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1,
cmt., 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1982)).
33. Id.
34. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
35. Id. at 11 (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn.
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He noted that while those individual tests may be helpful in
deciding whether contract or warranty should apply in a given case,
they are less helpful in determining whether, if both theories apply,
one or the other is exclusive. The problem is enhanced after the
adoption of strict liability in tort because “[a]lthough strict liability
is a tort, it is really a stripped-down model of a breach of warranty
36
claim, with the result that the two remedies frequently overlap.”
The real issue in those cases “is whether allowing the tort remedy
concurrent with breach of warranty would undermine the Uniform
37
Commercial Code.” The overlap problem is complicated by the
privity doctrine in sales law. Warranty protection extends not only
to subpurchasers but, under section 2-328 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, to “any person who may reasonably be expected
to . . . be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the
38
warranty.” In general terms:
As the Code’s warranty mantle extends out beyond
the immediate sale, the less need there is to deny to those
on the periphery of the sales transaction access to tort as
well as contract remedies. There is less likelihood, in such
cases, of the U.C.C. being undermined by allowing
concurrent tort remedies. On the other hand, the closer
the remedy comes to the very heart of the sales
transaction, the more need there is to preserve the
39
integrity of the Code.
Put another way:
[I]f the buyer of a defective product is not a merchant
dealing with another merchant in goods of the kind, the
buyer is not precluded from suing in tort as well as
contract for damage to his other property. When the
property damaged is not the property that was the subject
of the sale, there is less reason, as between unequal
contracting parties, to restrict the purchaser to his
warranty remedies under sales law. Such property losses
can be substantial. . . . But more importantly, allowing
1990)); see also 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. v. Carey-Can., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1992) (adopting the dangerous from a safety standpoint rule); S.J. Groves & Sons
Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter, 374 N.W.2d 431, 434–35 (Minn. 1985) (declining
to adopt the “sudden and calamitous” distinction). Justice Simonett was on the
court for all of these cases.
36. Lloyd F. Smith Co., 491 N.W.2d at 14.
37. Id.
38. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (2010).
39. Lloyd F. Smith Co., 491 N.W.2d at 14−15.
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tort liability in these cases does not undermine the Code’s
primary role in regulating risk of loss of the defective
40
product itself.
As applied, for the building owner and other tenants, as well as the
dentist seeking recovery for property damage to property other
than the dental chair, tort liability controlled, rather than the
41
Uniform Commercial Code.
Peterson and Lloyd F. Smith Co. clarify the law governing cases in
which plaintiffs have both tort and warranty claims involving
defective products. They provide a clear roadmap for determining
42
which theory applies and what the defenses will be to each.
II. DUTY AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS
While one person ordinarily owes no duty to act for the
protection of a third person, a duty may be imposed if there is a
special relationship between the defendant and plaintiff or
between the defendant and the person who causes the harm, and
43
the harm is foreseeable. Stating the basic principle is simple, but
the application is frequently not. Application of the basic rules is
heavily fact-dependent, of course, but policy considerations also
play a key role in how broadly or narrowly the rules governing
special relationships are applied.
The two cases noted in this section indicate both problems. In
44
the first, Leaon v. Washington County, a Washington County Deputy
Sheriff attended a stag party in which other men, apparently from
the department, forced him to be the recipient of certain lewd
action by a nude female dancer. He brought suit against
Washington County, the Green Acres Recreation site where the
party was held, the county sheriff, the four party organizers, and
John Doe defendants, alleging various intentional torts as well as
torts based on negligence. All claims were dismissed on the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff was
denied permission to amend his complaint to state a claim for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The last paragraph of the opinion effectively sets the stage for
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Two economic loss statutes, §§ 604.10, 604.101, also cover claims for
economic loss.
43. E.g., Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984).
44. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
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a discussion of the special relationship issue:
One final comment. The conduct at the party
towards Donald Leaon was despicable.
Nor is the
convenient “loss” of memory by law enforcement
personnel attending the party edifying. At the same time,
as the trial court observed, Donald Leaon “had as much
opportunity and certainly more reason to observe the
culpable parties.” Leaon has, however, been able to point
to only [two of the individuals who held him down]. We
concur with the trial judge’s concluding comment: “The
court is unable and unwilling to transfer the liability of the
unnamed wrongdoers to the individual defendants merely
because of their presence at the party or to Washington
County simply because it may have employed these
persons who behaved with such mean contempt of human
45
dignity on their off-duty hours.”
The court held that there was no duty on the part of the party
organizers based on a special relationship:
Ordinarily a person owes no duty to control the
conduct of another unless some special relationship
exists. Plaintiffs claim a duty arises here because the four
defendants were deputy sheriffs, because they were the
organizers of the stag party, and because, as “possessors of
the land,” they had a duty to keep the premises reasonably
safe. Mere status as police officers does not, however, give
rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Neither does
defendants’ status as organizers of the party create a
special relationship between them and Leaon requiring
them to exercise reasonable care to protect Leaon.
Finally, a possessor of land may have a duty to protect, but
this duty arises only if the possessor “(a) knows or has
reason to know that he has the ability to control the third
person, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity
and opportunity for exercising such control.” Ordinarily,
this is a question of fact, but nothing in the record
indicates that these two requirements for imposition of
46
section 318 liability might exist.
Given the factual setting, it seems clear that the special
relationship theory was a stretch, necessitated by the plaintiff’s
unwillingness to name all the parties who actually forced him to

45.
46.

Id. at 875.
Id. at 873 (citations omitted).
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engage in the conduct leading to the lawsuit.
The special relationship issue has to be approached with
caution, as Justice Simonett’s opinion in the second case, Erickson v.
47
Curtis Investment Co., indicates. The case was more complicated
from a policy standpoint. The case arose out of a sexual assault of a
parking ramp customer. He held in that opinion that the ramp
owner owed a duty to the customer.
The court had previously considered the special relationship
issue in a variety of contexts, including the duty of a business
holding its premises open to the public to entrants on the
48
premises, but because of the implications of a finding of duty,
Justice Simonett proceeded cautiously, noting that “[a]s to business
enterprises generally, the law has been cautious and reluctant to
impose a duty to protect,” and that “[a] mere merchant-customer
relationship is not enough to impose a duty on the merchant to
49
protect his customers.”
The opinion highlights Justice Simonett’s reasons for the need
for caution in cases involving the potential liability of a business for
failure to provide appropriate security for its customers. It echoes
the concerns he expressed in his special concurrence two years
50
earlier in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.
Although Justice Simonett had great faith in the jury system,
he was concerned that there would be a tendency in cases involving
security issues for the focus to be not on the measures the
defendant actually took, but whether additional security measures
might have prevented the crime and that those additional security
measures would ex post facto be the standard of care. He also
thought that the issue of whether the security precautions should
have been taken requires some hindsight determination but that
the tendency to invoke hindsight was exacerbated in cases involving
failure to take security precautions.
He also identified the cost-benefit equation as an additional
policy consideration in the case. Given the fact that society is
presumably not risk-free, he observed, the question of whether
security is adequate raises an issue as to what level of risk is
acceptable for members of the public, which necessitates a cost-

47.
48.
49.
50.

447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989).
E.g., Gresser v. Taylor, 276 Minn. 440, 150 N.W.2d 869 (1967).
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
407 N.W.2d 92, 101 (Minn. 1987) (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
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51

benefit analysis. “In these cases,” he observed, “we recognize the
jury may be deciding not so much a conflict in the facts as making
52
an evaluative policy judgment.”
He concluded that some duty was owed by the defendant. The
decisive facts were:
1. It was a large commercial parking ramp in a downtown
metropolitan area.
2. For a fee, several hundred cars were parked in the ramp.
3. The interior had several levels, with support pillars, stairwells,
and rows of unoccupied parked cars, which provided places of
concealment, particularly if the interior was dimly lit.
4. Anyone from the street could gain entrance to the ramp from
the street.
5. The ramp was relatively deserted. People were present only
momentarily, either to park and leave or retrieve their cars.
6. Unattended cars attracted thieves and vandals, and criminal
53
activity involving property crimes was common.
The general characteristics of parking ramps prompted him to
conclude that the opportunity for criminal activity is different from
and greater than the risk presented on the street and in the
54
neighborhood generally.
To ensure that the jury’s attention would be focused on the
relevant factors governing the breach issue, Justice Simonett also
stated that the defendant’s duty should be explained “along the
following lines”:
The operator or owner of a parking ramp facility has a
duty to use reasonable care to deter criminal activity on its
premises which may cause personal harm to customers.
The care to be provided is that care which a reasonably
51. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
52. Id. at 170. In a following footnote he quoted Holmes:
[E]very time that a judge declines to rule whether certain conduct is
neglect or not, he avows his inability to state the law, and that the
meaning of leaving nice questions to the jury is that while if a question is
pretty clear we can decide it, as it is our duty to do, if it is difficult it can
be decided better by twelve men at random from the street.
Id. at 170 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 234 (1920)). Over time, jury verdicts on similar facts
would, in Holmes’s opinion, enable a court to declare a specific standard of
conduct, leaving the jury only with the issue of whether that standard of conduct
was violated. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 14, 36 (1992).
53. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
54. Id.
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prudent operator or owner would provide under like
circumstances.
Among the circumstances to be
considered are the location and construction of the ramp,
the practical feasibility and cost of various security
measures, and the risk of personal harm to customers
which the owner or operator knows, or in the exercise of
due care should know, presents a reasonable likelihood of
happening. In this connection, the owner or operator is
not an insurer or guarantor of the safety of its premises
and cannot be expected to prevent all criminal activity.
The fact that a criminal assault occurs on the premises,
standing alone, is not evidence that the duty to deter
55
criminal acts has been breached.
A cautious opinion, Erickson establishes a limited liability rule
for business owners who are the subject of suits based upon
negligent failure to provide adequate security for their customers.
The conservative approach he counseled has defined subsequent
56
The
cases involving failure to provide security by businesses.
opinion is equivocal about the role of the jury in these cases and, in
light of those concerns, provides some detailed guidance as to how
the duty issue should be explained to a jury.
III. PREMISES LIABILITY
57

In Bisher v. Homart Development Co., the plaintiff was injured
when she tripped on a large, visible planter in a shopping mall.
The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which found the
defendant liable and the plaintiff contributorily negligent. The
jury assigned fifty-seven percent of fault to the defendant and fortythree percent to the plaintiff. The trial judge granted defendant’s
58
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appellate
review, the issue was whether there was any competent evidence
reasonably tending to sustain the verdict.
Justice Simonett, writing for the court, affirmed. The case
55. Id. at 169–70. The factors are roughly similar to the risk-utility factors
Justice Simonett suggested in his special concurring opinion in Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,
346 N.W.2d 616, 626 n.2 (Minn. 1984) (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
56. See, e.g., Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn.
2001); Anders v. Trester, 562 N.W.2d 45, 47–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(concluding fast food restaurant not liable for criminal assault of patron during
late night bar rush); Errico v. Southland Corp., 509 N.W.2d 585, 587–89 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding convenience store not liable for assault outside store).
57. 328 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1983).
58. Id. at 733.
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turned on the breach issue. The opinion noted the relevant factors
59
from Peterson v. Balach for resolving the breach issue, including
the circumstances of the injured person’s entry; the foreseeability
of harm; the defendant’s obligation to inspect, repair, or warn; the
reasonableness of any inspection or repair; and the opportunity of
60
correction or ease of repair.
Then, the court noted the
61
cautionary statement from Johnson v. Evanski that breach of duty
has to be based upon “what should have been reasonably
62
anticipated, not merely on what happened.” The landowner is
not required to guard against all possible consequences, but only
against those which should reasonably be anticipated “in the
63
normal course of events.”
Applying those standards, the court held that there was no
evidence establishing a breach of the defendant’s duty.
The planter was in plain view, obvious in its presence, and
had presented no problem for the heavy customer traffic
that has existed since 1977, except for the one other
accident that occurred after plaintiff’s. To place warning
signs at each corner of the multi-cornered planter would
be ridiculous. To add, say, another level of bricks to the
3½-inch high border would have made no difference to
plaintiff’s lookout and would not have prevented
64
plaintiff’s fall.
It was the plaintiff’s obligation to establish that a different design
would have made a difference. Justice Simonett concluded that she
did not make that showing. The case is a faithful application of
Peterson, in which the court held that a landowner owes a duty to
use reasonable care for the protection of property entrants. The
emphasis is on breach rather than duty.
In a second premises liability case, Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert
65
Enterprises, the issue concerned the liability of a roller skating rink
owner for injuries sustained by the fifty-seven-year-old plaintiff, who
fell while leaving one of the exits to get to the lobby area. There

59. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
60. Bisher, 328 N.W.2d at 733 (citing Peterson, 294 Minn. at 174 n.7, 199
N.W.2d at 648 n.7).
61. 221 Minn. 323, 22 N.W.2d 213 (1946).
62. Bisher, 328 N.W.2d at 733 (quoting Johnson, 221 Minn. at 326, 22 N.W.2d
at 215).
63. Id. (quoting Johnson, 221 Minn. at 326, 22 N.W.2d at 215).
64. Id. at 734.
65. 396 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1986).
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were two versions of the facts. The plaintiff attempted to prove that
she slipped on an improperly maintained threshold at the exit, but
the defendant’s proof refuted that and attempted to establish that
the plaintiff simply fell while trying to avoid a child while she was
exiting the rink. The governing legal principles turned on which
version the jury accepted. The jury found that the owner was not
negligent but that the plaintiff was 100% negligent. She appealed
from the trial court’s denial of her post-trial motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a new trial should be
66
granted. One of the issues in the case was whether the trial court
should have instructed the jury on primary assumption of risk.
Distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption of
risk has been problematic on a continuing basis in the Minnesota
decisions. The Wagner case is important because of the suggested
limitations on the reach of primary assumption of risk. The court
noted that “[o]ne of the few instances where primary assumption
of risk applies is in cases involving patrons of inherently dangerous
67
sporting events.” It applies where the “parties have voluntarily
entered a relationship in which plaintiff assumes well-known,
68
incidental risks.” The defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff to
protect the plaintiff from those incidental risks. The court added,
however, that primary assumption of risk does not operate to
relieve the defendant of a duty to supervise the safety of skating
activities or to maintain the premises in a safe condition.
“Negligent maintenance and supervision of a skating rink are not
69
inherent risks of the sport itself.”
Although the issue was not previously raised, Justice Simonett
commented on the method of submitting primary and secondary
assumption of risk to the jury, with the obvious intent of avoiding
confusion in future cases. The first special verdict question
submitted to the jury asked, “Was the Defendant negligent on April
70
12, 1982?” The jury was then instructed, “[I]f you find that the
accident on April 12, 1982 arose from a risk inherent in the activity
66. Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enters., 384 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
67. Wagner, 396 N.W.2d at 226 (citing Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23,
24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971)).
68. Id. (quoting Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127
(1974)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 227.
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of skating and well-known to plaintiff Vera L. Wagner, then you
71
must answer the question ‘No.’” The trial court also instructed
the jury on the defendant’s general duty of reasonable care to keep
its premises safe. The effect was that the first question had to
perform a double function. If the jury found that the plaintiff’s fall
was not due to an inherent skating risk, it could answer the
question “no” if it also found that the defendant had used
reasonable care in keeping its premises safe.
He noted that the jury answered the question in the negative
and that, under the evidence, could have done so. The negative
answer might have been supported either on primary assumption
of risk grounds or on the basis that the defendant did not breach
any duty to the plaintiff.
Justice Simonett suggested an alternative means of submission
in which the first question would ask whether the plaintiff assumed
an inherent risk of roller skating in her accident. If the jury
answered yes, it would be told to go no further, but if it answered
no, it would proceed to the remaining questions, beginning with a
72
question asking whether the defendant was negligent. That would
have separated the assumption of risk and liability issues into
separate questions and would have provided greater clarity for the
jury and in any post-trial review of the verdict.
The most important aspect of the case is the statement that
primary assumption of risk has limited application, primarily to
cases involving inherently dangerous sporting events.
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
73

In Kinikin v. Heupel, a medical malpractice case, the supreme
court in an opinion by Justice Simonett upheld a jury verdict for
$600,000 against the defendant physician. The plaintiff alleged
both battery and failure to obtain informed consent. The court
upheld the jury verdict, holding that it was not error to give both
instructions under the circumstances and that the informed
consent instruction was properly framed.
One of the issues in the case concerned the plaintiff’s
awareness of the risks of the surgery the physician performed. The
opinion evaluated the impact of a patient’s awareness of a risk on
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
305 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. 1981).
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an informed consent claim and then rejected it on the facts:
Concededly, a patient’s own medical expertise or
prior treatments could reduce the amount of information
needed from an attending physician to permit the patient
to make an intelligent decision concerning surgery.
Perhaps at times or in certain communities it is medical
practice to assume from a patient’s medical history some
medical expertise when explaining risks and alternate
courses of treatment to him, although here the
uncontroverted testimony of plaintiff’s expert was to the
contrary. In all situations, however, it is to the advantage
of both the patient and his physician that the latter not
presume too much upon the apparent experience or
expertise of the former.
We do not mean by this that a physician may be liable
for nondisclosure of a risk of which the patient had actual
knowledge. To win her case, plaintiff had to prove
proximate cause, of which there are two elements: first,
that had a reasonable person known of the risk he would
not have consented to treatment; and, second, that the
undisclosed risk materialized in harm. If the physician
could prove that the patient had actual knowledge of the
risk which materialized, then his negligence would be
immaterial and the patient’s case would fail. Here, Dr.
Heupel maintained that Mrs. Kinikin’s history of prior
abdominal surgeries made her aware of the risk of skin
necrosis presented by the breast surgery he performed
and, hence, that any failure of disclosure on his part was
not the proximate cause of her injuries. Mrs. Kinikin
disputed this and the jury resolved the issue in her favor.
74
We see no error.
The opinion cautions against physicians making undue
assumptions about a patient’s knowledge and experience for
informed consent case purposes. It is a reminder of the underlying
basis for informed consent doctrine. In light of that reminder, the
court refused to hold as a matter of law that there was no duty to
disclose, upholding the jury’s resolution of the issue in favor of the
plaintiff.

74.

Id. at 595–96 (citation omitted).
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V. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
Claims against governmental entities or government
employees involve questions of substantive liability but also require
consideration of immunities. One of the issues in cases where a
political subdivision fails to carry out its statutory obligations is
whether recovery is barred based on the public duty exception the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis
75
Park. Cracraft set out a four-factor test for determining when a
political subdivision owes a “special duty” to persons injured by the
political subdivision’s negligence. The factors include whether the
subdivision had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition;
whether there was reasonable reliance on specific representations
of the subdivision; whether the statutory obligation was for the
protection of a particular class; and whether the subdivision’s
76
action increased the risk of harm. Stating the test is easier than
applying it.
77
Andrade v. Ellefson was a case involving a claim for negligence
against day care providers and the county that licensed them.
Considering whether a political subdivision owes a duty under
Cracraft, Justice Simonett described the need for a limitation on the
liability of a political subdivision:
The regulatory and licensing presence of the state
and its political subdivisions in the affairs of the public is
pervasive. If there were blanket liability, it would be a rare
lawsuit where some unit of government would not be
sued. If one accepts the premise, as we do, that not all
government presence may impose potential tort liability
on the government, then some test like Cracraft is needed
to discern those instances where the state should be liable
for not protecting against the acts of someone who injures
someone else. This is not a matter of sovereign immunity
any more than a claim against [a next-door neighbor who
complained about overcrowding at the day care center]
would involve sovereign immunity. As we said in Cracraft,
there is no bright line, and each situation will require its
own analysis. The four Cracraft factors are helpful,
however, and on occasion there may be other relevant
factors as well. We might add, too, as to the four Cracraft
75.
76.
77.

279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 806–07.
391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986).
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factors, that while they should all be considered, all four
78
need not necessarily be met for a special duty to exist.
The third Cracraft factor was so “overwhelmingly dominant” that
the court had “no difficulty in finding” that “a ‘special relation’
exists between the county and the small children in the day care
79
homes that it inspects for licensure.” While the court in Cracraft
stated that the factors did not lead to a bright-line analysis, Justice
Simonett’s opinion emphasizes that the public duty exception is
applied with some flexibility. Cracraft is not a litmus test, and its
factors are not exclusive.
VI. MINN. STAT. § 347.22—THE DOG INJURY STATUTE
80

In Lewellin v. Huber, the issue concerned the scope of liability
under Minnesota Statutes section 347.22—the dog injury statute.
The statute applies where a dog “attacks or injures” a person. In
Lewellin, a dog that was riding in a car distracted the driver, who
lost control of her car and drove it into a ditch, hitting the
plaintiff’s decedent. While there was no question but that the
dog’s actions were a cause-in-fact of the accident, the court
concluded that the causal connection was too attenuated to justify
making the dog owner liable for the death of the decedent. While
Justice Simonett noted that the statute is intended to impose
absolute liability on the owner, the chain of causation may not be
attenuated. Without considering other potential scenarios, he
concluded that “[i]t is enough to say here that legal causation for
absolute liability under the statute must be direct and immediate,
81
i.e., without intermediate linkage.”
He noted that section 347.22 is not the exclusive remedy in
dog injury cases. He noted that a common law negligence action is
also potentially available in these cases and that the usual rules
governing proximate cause apply to those claims. In a negligence
action, the defendant is liable for “all injuries naturally and
proximately resulting from the negligence,” but he concluded that
78. Id. at 841.
79. Id. at 843. While the county would have sovereign immunity, it was
waived to the extent of the county’s liability insurance. For the legislative
responses to the problem, see id. at 843 n.7. The supreme court followed Andrade
in finding that the third factor was dominant in Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694
N.W.2d 788, 798 (Minn. 2005) (finding the county liable under the Child Abuse
Reporting Act).
80. 465 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1991).
81. Id. at 65.
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similarly elongating “the causal chain under the ‘dog bite’ statute
would extend absolute liability beyond its intended purpose and
82
reach.” He explained:
Courts have always used the tort doctrine of
proximate cause, as distinguished from causation in fact,
to implement public policy in establishing the parameters
of liability.
Thus this court has frequently quoted
Prosser’s statement that, “[a]s a practical matter, legal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
close to the result, or of such significance as causes, that
the law is justified in imposing liability. This limitation is
not a matter of causation, it is one of policy . . . .” In
applying our dog owner’s liability statute, public policy
and legislative intent are best served by limiting proximate
cause to direct and immediate results of the dog’s actions,
83
whether hostile or nonhostile.
Questions concerning the scope of liability have been an
84
ongoing problem in the interpretation of section 347.22.
Legislative intent and public policy caution against a broad
application of the statute. Justice Simonett’s approach to the
problem is straightforward. Liability under the statute has to be
limited. Basic proximate cause principles are the key to that
limitation.
VII. CIVIL DAMAGES ACT
Justice Simonett wrote for the court in two cases involving the
issue of what constitutes an illegal sale of alcohol under the Civil
85
86
The first was Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder.
Damages Act.
Hollerich involved an after-hours sale of alcohol and was, perhaps, a
slightly easier case, at least insofar as determining whether an afterhours sale is the sort of illegal sale contemplated by the Civil
87
88
Damages Act.
Rambaum v. Swisher is another example, but a
82. Id.
83. Id. at 65–66 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
84. Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012), is the supreme
court’s most recent foray into the scope of liability issue. The court relied heavily
on Lewellin in concluding that the injuries Anderson sustained in trying to separate
his dog from the attacking dog were directly and immediately caused by the
attacking dog.
85. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2010)
86. 340 N.W.2d 665 (Minn. 1983).
87. Justice Simonett emphasized that finding that an after-hours sale is an
“illegal sale” within the meaning of the Act solves only one of the requirements:
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more difficult case.
The issue in Rambaum was whether a sale of alcohol by a
fraternal club to a driver who was neither a member nor guest was
an “illegal sale” for purposes of liability under the Civil Damages
Act. Civil Damages Act cases require proof of an illegal sale, that
the illegal sale caused intoxication of a person, and that the
intoxication was a cause of injury to the intoxicated person or some
third person. The usual case involves a sale to an obviously
intoxicated person, but there are other cases where illegal sales
may be made, although connecting those violations to the purposes
of the Civil Damages Act is less intuitive than in cases involving sales
to obviously intoxicated persons. Justice Simonett reasoned that
the deeper history of the Act required broader consideration of the
illegal sale issue:
If we were writing on a clean slate, the argument that
dramshop liability should be limited to sales to obviously
intoxicated persons would not be unattractive as a matter
of logic. In 1917, however, this court held that an illegal
sale of liquor on Sunday was covered by the Dramshop
Act. In 1965, we added sales to minors, Kvanli v. Village of
Watson . . . , and 5 years ago we added after-hours sales.
We have looked to the manner in which certain kinds of
illegal sales impact on the public’s access to and
consumption of alcoholic beverages. The legislature has
not seen fit to disagree with our interpretations of the
Civil Damages Act over the years. In this case, with this
background, we think it significant that the legislature has
placed limits on the number of regular liquor licenses that
a municipality may issue based on population. See Minn.
Stat. § 340A.413 (1986). Club licenses, however, are
excepted from this license quota, even though clubs,
unlike some other special licensees, do substantial
business. The club exception is granted, however, with
the proviso that sales must be limited to club members
What must be remembered, however, is that more than an illegal sale is
required for dramshop liability. In addition, a claimant must, first,
establish that the illegal sale contributed to the intoxication, and, second,
that the intoxication contributed to cause the injury. As to the first
causation issue, a scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances must
show “a practical and substantial relationship” between the illegal sale
and intoxication.
Id. at 668 (quoting Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 484, 139 N.W.2d 275,
277 (1965)).
88. 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989).
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and guests. This proviso serves, we think, to limit the
extent clubs can compete for business with other licensed
vendors, thereby reducing the potential for alcohol abuse
that occurs with competition for consumers in an over89
saturated market.
Because of the legislature’s strict regulation of alcohol vendors
and its deep concern over the problem of alcohol abuse, the court
held that the relationship between the restrictive club license and
the purposes of the Civil Damages Act was sufficiently substantial to
make a club sale to a nonmember an illegal sale. The result was
justified by a careful consideration of precedent interpreting a
statute with a long history. Absent that history, Justice Simonett
likely would have reached a different result.
VIII. COMPARATIVE FAULT
90

In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., Hudson was injured when the
box of a dump truck dropped on his shoulder. He and his wife
brought suit in negligence and strict liability against the
manufacturer of the hoist that raised the box of the truck
(Perfection), the dealer that supplied the chassis on which the box
was mounted (Potomac), and the company that assembled the
truck (Snyder). The assembler brought a third-party claim for
contribution and indemnity against the plaintiff’s employer
(Olsen). The jury found for the plaintiff. It found each defendant
liable on the negligence and strict liability theories and assigned
fault as follows:
Hudson
20%
Snyder
35%
Perfection 25%
Potomac
0%
Olsen
20%
The defendants appealed. The supreme court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The court held that the evidence did not support
any finding of negligence on the part of the chassis dealer,
Potomac, and that Potomac, which simply passed on a product, was
not the cause of the defect. The court also held that Olsen, the
employer, could be held liable on the contribution claim by the
defendants, even though the plaintiff’s fault was equal to Olsen’s
89.
90.

Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted).
326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982).
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and Olsen, had it been a defendant, could not have been held
liable to the plaintiff (the comparative negligence statute, at the
time, barred from recovery a plaintiff whose fault was equal to or
greater than the fault of the defendant).
Justice Simonett concurred in part and dissented in part. He
dissented from the majority’s conclusion that Olsen, the employer,
could be held liable on a contribution claim by the defendants.
Even though workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy of
the plaintiff and the employer could not have been held liable in a
direct suit by its employee, Justice Simonett thought that irrelevant,
given the right of third parties to obtain contribution from
91
employers, but he would not have created a pure comparative
92
fault exception to the Comparative Fault Act.
In analyzing the liability of the dealer, Potomac, he thought
that the jury’s findings, that Potomac sold a defective unit yet was
zero percent at fault, were not inconsistent. He concluded that it
meant only that Potomac sold a defective product but was not
responsible for the defect. He understood the majority opinion to
mean that Potomac was liable, “but only in a vicarious or derivative
93
sense as the inert seller in the marketing chain.” He observed
that “[t]his is not the kind of conduct that needs to be included in
a comparative fault question, and the jury properly ignored it.
Potomac should be found liable to plaintiffs but entitled to
94
indemnity from the other defendants . . . .”
Justice Simonett’s analysis becomes important in cases where a
party lower in the chain of manufacture and distribution sold a
95
defective product but is not assigned a percentage of fault. It
helps to clarify the majority opinion and provides critical guidance
in determining how the fault of multiple parties should be
submitted to a jury where the fault of one or more parties is
91. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679
(1977).
92. Hudson, 326 N.W.2d at 159 (Simmonett, J., concurring specially).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The seller’s exception statute, MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2010), enacted in
1980 but not applicable to the case, allows a seller lower in the chain to avoid strict
liability where the manufacturer is solvent and subject to jurisdiction in
Minnesota, but there may be cases where the manufacturer’s fault is submitted on
a special verdict form and the manufacturer’s fault is set at 100% but the
manufacturer is bankrupt. A retailer found to have sold the defective product is
nonetheless liable for 100% of the damages. See Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573
N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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vicarious or derivative.
96
In Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., an important case interpreting
the Comparative Fault Act, the plaintiff was injured in the course of
her employment with Bayliner Boats when a drill handle slipped
and twisted, causing her serious injuries. The plaintiff brought suit
against the manufacturer of the drill, Sioux Tools. The jury found
the plaintiff 35% at fault, Sioux Tools 20% at fault, and Bayliner
Boats 45% at fault. The issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled
to recover against Sioux Tools, even though her fault was greater
than Sioux Tools’s.
Justice Simonett, writing for the court, held that she could not.
The plaintiff argued that the fault of the defendants should be
aggregated in cases such as this, where the fault of the defendants
overlapped. He rejected the argument. Minnesota precedent is
clear. Absent proof of an economic joint venture, there is no
aggregation of fault. The overlapping duty argument would
expand that precedent and present a jury with a “nearly impossible
97
task” of sorting out what portions of fault overlap. Furthermore,
there was no joint duty in the case. Bayliner and Sioux Tools were
98
simply concurrently negligent.
One cannot help but wonder whether the opinion was also
99
influenced by Delgado v. Lohmar, a 1979 case in which a farm
owner was blinded by a shot fired by one of the members of a
grouse hunting party. Justice Simonett, in private practice,
represented one of the members of the hunting party who had not
fired the shot. In a joint brief, the respondents argued that liability
should not be imposed on the other members of the hunting party
under a joint enterprise liability theory. While I do not know
whether Justice Simonett wrote the following part of the brief, the
style and mode of argument certainly sound like his. If he did not
author that part of the brief, he must have influenced it:
Prosser, in his fourth edition, has an excellent
discussion of joint enterprise. He points out how it rests
on an analogy to the law of partnership, but that “except
in comparatively rare instances,” its application outside
commercial transactions has been in the field of
automobile negligence. Prosser does not believe joint
96.
97.
98.
99.

323 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 799.
289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979).
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enterprise should apply to situations of friendly
cooperation and accommodation, “where there is not the
same reason for placing all risks upon the enterprise
itself,” as there is in the case of a business venture.
Moreover, to say here the parties on a hunting trip
entered into a contractual relationship and to say, further,
that each member shared a “right of control” over the
others, and, then, to say further, that each hunter was the
agent or servant of the others, is to pile here fictions on
top of each other. “This top heavy structure,” says Prosser,
referring to the three fictions, “tends to fall of its own
weight.” Prosser, Torts, (4th ed.), pp. 475–481.
Moreover, the policy implications of plaintiffs’ theory
are alarming. Every Minnesota hunter—no matter if he
or she is not at fault, for that is irrelevant—becomes liable
for the fault of anyone else in the group. And if
negligence can be imputed to persons hunting,
presumably it can be imputed to persons playing golf
together or baseball or whatever. This is not, and should
100
not be, the law.
101
In Rambaum v. Swisher, the court considered the relationship
between a Pierringer release and the Comparative Fault Act. The
plaintiff’s post-collateral-source discount damages totaled
$268,241.67. The jury assigned 10% of the fault in the case to a
fraternal organization where the plaintiff was illegally served
alcohol, 10% to another bar where the plaintiff drank, and 80% to
Swisher, the driver of the car that hit the plaintiff. The plaintiff
settled with the other bar for $200,000. The remaining defendants
argued that the full amount of the settlement should be deducted
from the damages. The fair share of the remaining bar, the
Croatian Club, would have been 10% of the damages, or
$26,924.17. The plaintiff arguably would receive a windfall if
permitted to recover the damages against the remaining
defendants with no deduction for the settlement.
The
Comparative Fault Act seemed to anticipate this in subdivision 5 of
section 604.01:
All settlements and payments made under
subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be credited against any final
settlement or judgment; provided however that in the
100. Respondents’ Brief at 17−18, Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn.
1979) (No. 49636).
101. 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 11

2013]

JUSTICE SIMONETT AND THE LAW OF TORTS

825

event that judgment is entered against the person seeking
recovery or if a verdict is rendered for an amount less
than the total of any such advance payments in favor of
the recipient thereof, such person shall not be required to
refund any portion of such advance payments voluntarily
made. Upon motion to the court in the absence of a jury
and upon proper proof thereof, prior to entry of
judgment on a verdict, the court shall first apply the
provisions of subdivision 1 and then shall reduce the
amount of the damages so determined by the amount of
the payments previously made to or on behalf of the
102
person entitled to such damages.
The defendant fraternal organization argued that if the settlement
exceeded the settling defendant’s fair share, the amount by which
the settlement exceeded the settling defendant’s fair share should
be credited against the plaintiff’s award. Justice Simonett rejected
that argument. Applying the Pierringer payment in full against the
entire award would be contrary to the intent of the parties to the
settlement, “who agreed to deduct from the verdict award only that
portion of the settlement payment attributable to the fault of the
103
It would also seriously impair the utility of
settling defendant.”
the Pierringer release.
Justice Simonett noted that subdivision 5 of the Comparative
Fault Act was enacted in 1969, before the Pierringer release was
104
recognized by the supreme court, and that the legislature did not
appear to have Pierringer releases in mind when it adopted
105
Allowing an overall pro tanto reduction of the
subdivision 5.
plaintiff’s damages would effectively dismantle the Pierringer
release, he concluded, and the nonsettling defendants would
obtain a “windfall” and provide it with a further reason for not
106
considering settlement.
Of necessity, subdivision 5 had to be
ignored.

102. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 5 (2010).
103. Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 22–23.
104. The supreme court recognized the Pierringer release in Frey v. Snelgrove,
269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978). Of course, Justice Simonett wrote the
definitive article on Pierringer releases in Minnesota when he was in practice. See
John E. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977).
105. Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 23.
106. Id.
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IX. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
107

Florenzano v. Olson was a fraudulent misrepresentation case
brought against an insurance agent based upon false
representations that induced the insured to withdraw from
participation in the social security program.
The case is
complicated because of the various forms a misrepresentation
claim may take. Justice Simonett concurred specially:
The majority opinion, as I read it, holds that (1)
comparative negligence does not apply to an intentional
tort; (2) plaintiffs failed to prove intentional fraud as a
matter of law; and (3) while negligent misrepresentation
was proven, comparative negligence applies, and the jury’s
verdict putting 62.5% negligence on plaintiff precludes
plaintiffs’ recovery. I join in the result reached by the
majority and in its essential holdings, but because the
subject is important, with consequences yet to be seen,
and because my approach differs in some respects, I take
this occasion to write. The majority opinion, prudently,
leaves to another day a further formulation of the concept
of intentional misrepresentation. Yet, it seems to me, that
formulation is very much implicated here and it might be
useful to say something more, if not to provide a solution,
108
at least to point out where the problems lie.
The concurrence goes on to further clarify. The court accepted
the proposition that comparative negligence is inapplicable to
claims involving intentional torts, raising the issue of when a
fraudulent misrepresentation is intentional. Intent to deceive is a
clear case. He reads the majority opinion to say that a defendant
asserting a fact as of his own knowledge without knowing if it is true
or false would also constitute an intentional tort. In discussing
fraud claims, he wrote:
It seems to me that under the broad category of fraud
we have three types of actionable misrepresentations: the
first is deceit; the second, for want of a better name, I will
call reckless misrepresentation; and the third is negligent
misrepresentation. The first two types have always been
109
combined under the Davis v. Re-Trac formulation, but
now, because of the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 604.01
107. 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986).
108. Id. at 176–77 (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
109. Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 149 N.W.2d 37 (1967)
(footnote added by author).
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and today’s holding, they must be separated at least for
the purpose of determining whether comparative
110
negligence or fault applies.
The concurrence takes the position that comparative responsibility
applies to reckless and negligent misrepresentations but not to
deceit claims. “The dividing line is the ‘intent to deceive’ which
distinguishes deceit from the other two torts and which makes
111
deceit a true, not a fictional, intentional tort.”
The majority opinion suggested that, where a case is submitted
to the jury on intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims,
there should be separate interrogatories on the intent element
asking, first, whether the defendant knew the facts to be false and,
if not, whether the defendant asserted the facts as of his or her own
knowledge without knowing if they were true or false. Justice
Simonett clarified that approach by suggesting an alternative that
focused on the representation, as well as what the impact of the
findings would be on the application of comparative negligence
principles:
In future cases where both deceit and reckless
misrepresentation are submitted to the jury, I assume the
trial court, in submitting the 11 elements of
misrepresentation . . . , may wish to separate the element
of “fraudulent intent” into two questions, namely: (1) Did
defendant know the representation to be false? and, if
not, then (2) Did defendant assert the representation as
of his own knowledge without knowing whether it was true
or false? Only if the second question is answered yes
112
would comparative negligence apply.
Here, as elsewhere, he writes separately, just to clarify a few things.
He makes suggestions that will avoid further confusion, and he
makes a suggestion as to how claims involving intentional and
negligent misrepresentations can be submitted to a jury to achieve
a clear resolution of the separate claims, as well as providing a clear
basis for applying comparative negligence principles to
misrepresentation claims.

110.
111.
112.

Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 177 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
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X. CONCLUSION
A discussion of these nine areas of tort and tort-related law
cannot do full justice to the talents of the Justice in structuring and
applying the law of torts. The strength of his approach to crafting
his opinions, a more descriptive word than writing, is his
consistency in striving to simplify the law and to apply the rules
fairly. While Holmes may have said that his job was not to do
113
justice but to apply the rules, Justice Simonett most certainly did
both. He decided cases, of course, but he taught the law so that
judges, lawyers, and juries could do justice in applying it.

113. See Michael Herz, “Do Justice!” Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L.
REV. 111, 111 (1996). Justice Simonett quoted Holmes in The Use of the Term
“Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate Decisions. Simonett, supra note 2, at 201.
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